Contents
“Most mergers fail” is one of business’s favourite sayings. Like most sayings, it is half true. The research on mergers and acquisitions, usually shortened to M&A, points to a more precise answer: deals on average do create value, but the buyer often pays so much for it that its own shareholders gain little or lose. Who wins depends heavily on the kind of deal and who is making it.
This article is general information, not personal financial advice.
How researchers measure success
There are two main ways to judge whether a deal worked.
- The market’s verdict on announcement. Economists look at how the share prices of the buyer and the target move in the days around the announcement, compared with what the wider market did. The idea is that investors immediately weigh up the likely gains and the price paid.
- Performance afterwards. Researchers compare the merged company’s profits or share price over the following years with similar companies that did not merge.
Both methods have weaknesses. The first captures expectations, not results. The second is muddied by everything else that happens to a business over several years. That is why studies can reach different conclusions about the same deals.
The broad answer: deals do add value, mostly for sellers
One of the most widely cited reviews, by the economists Gregor Andrade, Mark Mitchell and Erik Stafford, looked at US mergers from 1973 to 1998. They found that the stock market’s response when deals were announced was positive for the buying and selling companies taken together, suggesting that mergers create value for shareholders overall. They also found evidence that the merged companies’ operating performance improved compared with others in their industry.
The catch is how that value is shared. A buyer almost always pays a premium, a price above what the target’s shares were worth before the bid. If the premium is larger than the gains the deal produces, the target’s shareholders capture all of the value and more, and the buyer’s shareholders lose.
Mergers tend to create value for the two companies combined. The question is who gets it.”
When buyers lose: the 1998 to 2001 wave
The late-1990s boom shows how badly that can go. Sara Moeller, Frederik Schlingemann and René Stulz studied buyers’ share prices when acquisitions were announced between 1998 and 2001.
The last line matters most. In that period the buyers’ losses were larger than the sellers’ gains, so the deals as a group destroyed value.
| Item | US dollars, billions |
|---|---|
| 1998 to 2001 | About $240bn |
| The whole of the 1980s | About $7bn |
Source: Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, NBER. Chart: The Sidelight.
Why buyers overpay
Several explanations have support in the research.
Overconfident bosses. Ulrike Malmendier and Geoffrey Tate developed measures of overconfidence in chief executives and looked at the deals they made. Overconfident executives made more acquisitions, especially deals outside their company’s main business. The stock market reacted significantly more negatively when they announced a bid. The effect was strongest in companies with plenty of cash and unused borrowing capacity, where the boss faced fewer checks from lenders or outside investors.
Competition for targets. When several bidders want the same company, the winner is often the one that has most overestimated its value, a problem economists call the winner’s curse.
Overestimated savings. Deals are usually justified by synergies, the cost savings and extra sales from combining two businesses. These are easy to promise and hard to deliver, especially when they depend on merging different computer systems, cultures and teams.
Momentum. Merger activity comes in waves and clusters in particular industries, as Andrade and his co-authors found. When many companies are buying at once, competition for targets pushes prices up.
Not all deal-making is the same
Recent evidence suggests the way a company buys matters as much as whether it buys. McKinsey, the consultancy, has tracked the deal strategies of the world’s largest companies for two decades. It sorts them into groups: companies that grow without deals, those that make occasional selective deals, those that make large transformational deals, and “programmatic” acquirers, which make many small and medium-sized deals year after year.
Its 2021 analysis found that programmatic acquirers delivered on average about 2% more in excess annual returns to shareholders than their peers. None of the other approaches produced excess returns on average. McKinsey’s explanation is that regular buyers build skills in finding, pricing and integrating companies that occasional buyers lack, and that no single deal is large enough to sink them.
Two cautions apply. McKinsey sells advice on deals, so it has an interest in showing that deals can work. And its findings show association, not cause: companies that are well run may both make more deals and perform better.
What the evidence suggests
Read together, the research points to a few consistent patterns.
- Mergers add value on average, but sellers capture most of it. Target shareholders usually do well. Buyer shareholders often break even or lose.
- Occasional big bets have not paid on average. In McKinsey’s data, companies relying on large one-off deals produced no excess returns for shareholders.
- Habit helps. Companies that buy often, in manageable sizes, have done better than those that make occasional big bets.
- Governance matters. Buyers with overconfident bosses, spare cash and weak outside checks have done worse.
What would change the conclusion
The strongest evidence on buyer losses comes from US deals in the late 1990s and early 2000s, a period of exceptional market exuberance. Market conditions and the mix of buyers have changed since then. Newer studies covering the 2010s and 2020s, especially for the UK, would show whether buyers have become more disciplined or whether the old pattern of overpaying persists.
For shareholders in a company that announces a big acquisition, the research offers a simple question to ask: what is the price, and how sure are the promised savings? If the answer to the second depends on everything going right, history suggests caution.
References and sources
- 01New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers · Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford, Journal of Economic Perspectives · 2001
- 02Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale? A Study of Acquiring-Firm Returns in the Recent Merger Wave · Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, National Bureau of Economic Research · January 2004
- 03Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market’s Reaction · Malmendier and Tate, National Bureau of Economic Research · October 2004
- 04How one approach to M&A is more likely to create value than all others · McKinsey & Company · 13 October 2021
- 05Lead image: City of London skyline 1.jpg · Dimitri Hon, via Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 3.0) · Accessed 13 November 2026
House byline
Articles under this byline are researched and drafted with AI assistance, with every figure checked against its source before publication. The editor, Pankaj Guleria, reviews them and corrects them where needed.
Edited by Pankaj Guleria, Founder and Editor




